Recent American Decisions by H., W. A.
LITTLEFIELD vs. INHABITANTS OF BROOKS.
RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
Supreme Court of Maine.
ELI F. LITTLEFIELD vs. INHABITANTS OF BROOKS.
A domicil once acquired continues till a new one is gained. While in transit the
old domicil remains.
An inhabitant of A. on 30th March leaves that place with the intention of residing
in C.; on 1st April he arrives at B. and the next day reaches C., where he
establishes his residence. It was held, that for the purposes of taxation he was
to be deemed an inhabitant of A. on 1st April, and was ijable to taxation there.
Exception to the ruling of APPLETON, J.
This was assumpeit in which the plaintiff claims to recover the
amount paid to the collector of the defendant town as taxes-the
payment of which he contests, on the ground that he was not an
inhabitant thereof.
The only question raised is his liability to taxation as an inhab-
itant of the defendant town.
It appeared that in March, 1860, the plaintiff was an inhabitant
of Brooks; that on the 30th of March he formed the intention of
leaving that town as his place of residence; that he accordingly
left that day and went to Monroe; that on the 1st April he pro-
ceeded to Bangor, where he spent the night, and on the 2d of
April reached Oldtown, at which place it was his intention to make
his residence when he left Brooks.
On these facts the presiding judge decided that for the purposes
of taxation the plaintiff was an inhabitant of Brook;, anl was there
legally taxed, and thereupon ordered a nonsuit-to which the
plaintiff filed exceptions.
G. P. Sewall, for plaintiff.
.Blake & Garnsey, for defendants.
APPLETON, 0. J.-By R. S. 1857, ch. 6, sec. 1, it is provided
that "a poll-tax shall be assessed upon every male inhabitant of
this State above the age of twenty-one years, whether a citizen of
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the United States or an alien, in the manner provided by law,
unless he is exempted therefrom by the provisions of this chapter."
By sect. 10, "all personal property, within or without this State
except in the cases enumerated in the following section, shall be
assessed to the owner in the town where he is an inhabitant on the
first day of April in each year." Neither the plaintiff nor his
property are within the exemptions nor the exceptions of the
statute.
By thcse provisions it is unmistakeably apparent that it was the
legislative intention that every male inhabitant of this State, and
that all personal property within the same, with certain exceptions
not affecting this case, should be taxed. No person is to be
exempt. No one should be. No property is exempt. None
should be. The payment of taxes is the price paid for the pro-
tection which government gives to person and to property. The
State affords security to all persons. It protects all property.
The burden of maintaining government should be co-extensive with
the benefits conferred.
The statute assumes that every inhabitant of the State is an
inhabitant of some place therein. Every inhabitant, by the statu-
tory definition of the word, has an "established residence" some-
where: R. S. 1857, ch. 1, sec. 2. If this be not so, then one
might be an inhabitant and not within the exception, and yet not
liable to taxation, which would be against the plain and clear
language of the statute. Assuming, therefore, that-'all the male
inhabitants of the State, not specially exempted, are to be taxed
somewhere, the question arises where was the plaintiff to be taxed?
To determine this, it remains to ascertain where he was an
inhabitant-where had he a domicil. Domicil, says Phillimore in
his Law of Domicil 13, is "a residence at a particular place,.
accompanied with positive or presumptive proof of an intention to
remain there for an unlimited time." "Every one at birth re-
ceives a domicil of origin, which adheres till another is acquired;
and so throughout life, each successive domicil can only be lost by
the acquisition of a new one:" Westlake, Private International
Law 33. While in transitu the old one remains. It continues
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till a new one is acquired, facto et animo. The Roman Law was
otherwise. It was siquis domicilio relieto naviget vd iter faciat,
qucerens quo se conferat "itque ubi constituat, hune Puto sine domi-
eilio esse. But such is not our law. The old domicil continues
tili the acquisition of the new one: Story, Conflict of Laws, § 48.
The plaintiff has a domicil somewhere. He is to be deemed an
inhabitant of some place. He was in itinere. He was not an
inhabitant of Oldtown, to which he was going, for the fact of per-
sonal presence was wanting. He was not an inhabitant of Bangor,
for the intention to be one, which is an indispensable requirement,
did not co-exist with the fact of his personal presence. The old
domicil was not lost, for the new one was not gained. He was
rightly taxed in the defendant town: Bulkely vs. Williamston, 3
Gray'493. Were it otherwise, one might eiade taxation, which
would be a meanness, abhorrent to every honorable and honest
mind. It would be to enjoy the benefits and shirk the burdens
of government.
The counsel for the plaintiff in his very able argument has
called our attention to certain decisions of this Court in relation
to the settlement of paupers as applicable to the present inquiry.
Before considering and examining the cases to which we have
been referred, it may be observed that the purpose and object of
the statutes relating to taxes and to paupers, and the language
in which they are respectively embodied, are entirely different.
When a pauper gains a settlement, it is by having "his home in a
town five successive years, without receiving, directly or indirectly,
supplies as a pauper:" R.-S. 1857, ch. 24, sec.'1. -One becomes
an inhabitant, one acquires a domicil, by the residence of a day,
if to this the requisite intention be superadded.
In considering the decisions under the statute relating to pau-
pers, it should be further remembered that neither the word
"domicil" nor "inhabitant" is to be found therein, and the
opinion of the Court in each case is made to depend upon the
peculiar language of the act under consideration. In -Exeter vs.
Brighton, 15 Maine 58, WESTOW, C. J., says : "If he (the pauper)
abandons his former residence with an intention not to return, but
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to fix his home elsewhere, while in the transit to his new and it
may be distant destination, we are of opinion that whatever may
be said of his domicil, his home has ceased at his former residence;
within the meaning of the statute for the relief of the poor."
In Jefferson vs; Washington, 19 Maine 293, WHITmAN, C. J.i
uses the following language: "The counsel for the defendant in
error, in his argument, treats the words dwelling-place and home
as if synonymous with domicil, and proceeds to argue that one
domicil continues till another is gained, and that to have a domicil
a man need not have any particular place of dwelling or for his
home; and he cites numerous authorities to support his positior.
But the answer to all is, that domicil, though in familiar language
used very properly to signify a man's dwelling-house, has in certain
cases arising under international law and in kindred cases thereto,
a sort of technical* meaning. And the authorities cited all apply
to it in this sense. It fixes the character of the indiyidual in
reference to certain rights, duties, and obligations; but dwelling-
place and home have a more limited, precise, and local applica-
tion." In Warren vs. Thomaston, 43 Maline 406, RIcE, J., in
delivering the opinion of the Court, says: "In the discussions in
our books upon the pauper law the term domicil is frequently used.
The term is not found in the statute, but has been interpolated
upon it by the Court. Its introduction has at times, it is feared,
tended to confuse and mislead rather than to simplify and aid in
the trial of this class of cases. In its, ordinary sense, as used by
legal writers, it has not the same restricted meaning as the words
residence, dwelling-place, and home have in the statute under
consideration." The meaning of words and the purport of lan-
guage must ever have reference to the purposes for which they are
used, and the subject-matter to which they-refer.
Exceptions overruled.
CUTTING, GOODENoW, DAVIS, ]KENT, and WALTON, JJ., concurred.
The principles of law upon which the ' cation of these familiar principles or
foregoing opinion rests, seem to be very maxims to the complicated facts of cases.
well established, but a difficulty-often And this is the, more obvious when we
rat inconsiderable-arises in the appli- remember, as remarked by Chief Justice
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SUAW in Thorndike vs. City of Boston,
1 Met., that "it may often occur that
the evidence of facts tending to establish
the domicil in one place would be
entirely conclusive were it not for the
existence of facts and circumstances of
a still more conclusive and decisive
character which fix it beyond question
in another." The principles or maxims
to which reference has been made are,
"that every person has a domicil some-
where, and no person can have more
than one domicil at the same time for
one and the same purpose." And it
follows from these maxims that "a man
retains his domicil of origin till he
changes it by acquiring another; and
so each successive domicil continues
until changed by acquiring another :"
Opinion of the Judges of .the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 5 Met.
587; Otis vs. Boston, 12 Cush. 50. It
is equally well settled that in order to
change the domicil the fact and intent
must concur-neither alone is sufficient
-by which it must be intended that
there needs to be a change of residence,
with an intention to remain in the new
place of residence an indefinite time,
and without the intention of returning
to the former domicil at any particular
period or when any particular purpose
is accomplished: Hegeman vs. Fox, 31
Barb. (N. Y.) 475; Bulkley vs. Inhabit-
ants of Williamstown, 3 Gray 495;
Holmes vs. Greene, 7 Id. 300; Jamaica
vs. Townshend, 19 Verm. 267; Mann vs.
Clark, 33 Id. 60; Hairston vs. Hairston,
27 Miss. 704; Henrietta vs. Oxford, 2
Ohio (N. S.) 32. Doubtless this must
be taken with a reasonable limitation as
to the time occupied in accomplishing
the particular purpose, otherwise a
"general residence might grow on the
special purpose." See 1 Am. Lead.
Cases 750, as to this point, in regard to
domicils generally: Mann vs. Clark,
supra. It often happens in eases of
divided residence that thn circumstances
of each are so nearly balanced that the
intention of the party to consider the one
or the other to be his domicil will de-
termine it to be so.
The fact of change of residence being
open and notorious, generally and na-
turally the proof is comparatively easy.
The intent or the purpose of the change
of residence, not always so distinctly
marked by outward acts, may not be so
easy of proof. The conduct of the party,
what he does in regard to the removal,
is often quite sufficient to prove the
intent. In addition, the declarations of
the party in repard to the" purpose of
his change .of residence, made in con-
nection with any acts of remQval, arB
admissible in his behalf.
In Cole vs. Cheshire, 1 Gray 444
THOMAs, J., says: "The plaintiff must
prove that he left Cheshire with the
intent of abandoning his old domicil
and of acquiring a new one. That
intent is manifested by what he does,
and by what he says when doing, and
sometimes as significantly by what he
omits to do or to say." See Kilburn vs.
Brunett, 3 Met. 200.
In Thorndike vs. City of Boston, 1
Met. 242, it was held that a letter from
plaintiff to his agent, containing in-
structions as to sale of his mansion-
house in Bostoei, ind expressing his
intention not to return to Boston, writ-
ten about a year after he had left
Boston, but before he had any know-
ledge that the tax in question had been
assessed on him, was admissible. It
was admitted as a part of the res geacev,
and the fact was mentioned, that it was
written before any controversy existed,
or the plaintiff knew that he was taxed.
In Salem vs. Lynn, 13 Met. 545, DEWEY,
J., says in his opinion in which Thorn-
dike vs. Boston is cited, after stating thl
